Rumeli in the period of dynastic instability : why were the Ottoman Balkans so important for the dynasty in the first half of the 15th century? by Dobosz, Krzysztof
 
 
ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ  
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), S. 29–43  
 E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383  
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE 
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDSP.10.2019.24.2 
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0003-2805-3115 
 
KRZYSZTOF DOBOSZ 
 
JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW 
FACULTY OF HISTORY 
E-MAIL: KRZYSZTOF.DOBOSZ@OUTLOOK.COM 
 
SUBMISSION: 31.03.2019 
ACCEPTANCE: 18.06.2019 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Rumeli in the Period of Dynastic Instability.  
Why Were the Ottoman Balkans So Important for  
the Dynasty in the First Half of the 15th Century? 
 
 
ABSTRACT   
 
As Peter Mentzel states, the Balkans (Rumeli) were not only a borderland but also 
the core province of the early Ottoman state. The Rumelian military aristocracy played 
one of the most important roles in the internal policy. It constituted an important factor, 
which was powerful enough to create the Ottoman policy. That is why Murad I forbade 
the Ottoman princes to lead the akıncı warriors in order to avoid the risk of a dynastic 
war. He also started devshirme among Christian families in the Balkans so as to build 
trustworthy groups of servants for the dynasty. Obviously, the province gained impor-
tance in the difficult times after the defeat at Ankara (1402). During the civil war (1402–
1413, fetret devri) Rumeli was governed by one of the brothers who claimed power over 
the whole Ottoman territory. The deciding struggles between the sons of Bayezid I took 
place in the Balkans and their result depended mainly on the attitudes shown by the 
Rumelian warriors and their frontier lords. The rulers who lost the support of the 
Rumelian military class quickly lost the throne of Rumeli as well. It happened in the cases 
of Emir Süleyman, prince Musa, and Düzme Mustafa. 
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Rumeli—the region ruined until the mid-fourteenth century by a series of 
calamities: wars, war-related plunders and the Black Death1—evolved into 
a kind of the Promised Land for the Turks. The depopulated former territories 
of the Byzantine Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria, the power over which was 
divided between magnate dynasties fighting against each other, were an ex-
cellent place to settle down.2 Initially, these sites were perceived as the domain 
of war (dār al-ḥarb). In response to the situation faced on the European side of 
the Black Sea straits, the Turks established a comprehensive frontier system 
with gazis as its basic element.3 Anatolia was a region where Christianity and 
Islam co-existed for hundreds of years. Meanwhile, the lack of such a tradition 
in the Balkans meant that local peoples were more inclined to fight against the 
Turks arriving from the east and south.4 In a relatively short time, the Turkish 
element became significant in the Balkans, and the frontier moved north and 
west.5 After the Battle of the Maritsa, which took place in 1371, the plains of 
Thrace and Macedonia were the place where the Anatolians settled in, espe-
cially during the devastating invasions led by Timur the Lame. It was then that 
a large influx of people arrived from different parts of the Ottoman lands 
in Asia, which was noted by the author of the Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle.6 
The second similar event occurred in the 16th century when the Kalender 
Çelebi rebellion gave rise to civil unrest in Anatolia.7 In this sense, one may say 
that the Ottoman rule brought peace in the south-eastern part of the Balkans 
although this is sometimes interpreted as a situation unfavourable for Rumeli, 
especially at the time when the gazis had to be held back for political reasons.8 
                                                 
1 A. E. Laoiu-Thomadakis, Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire. A Social and 
Demographic Study, Princeton 1977, pp. 7–8. 
2 M. M. Aktepe, XIV. ve XV. Asırlarda Rumeli’nin Türkler Tarafından İskānına Dair, „Türki-
yat Mecmuası” 1953, 10, pp. 299–300. 
3 M. Kiel, The Incorporation of the Balkans into the Ottoman Empire, 1353–1453, [in:] The 
Cambridge History of Turkey, vol. I: Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453, ed. K. Fleet, Cambridge 
2009, pp. 149–155. 
4 L. Darling, Reformulating the Gazi Narrative: When was the Ottoman State a Gazi State?, 
“Turcica” 2011, 43, p. 35; R. P. Lindner, Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia, Bloom-
ington 1983, p. 4. 
5 Evidence of this is the fact that Evrenos Bey changed his location three times. See for 
reference: A. Kılıç, Gazi Evrenos Bey. Bir Osmanlı Akıncı Beyi, İstanbul 2014, pp. 65, 67; R. P. 
Lindner, Anatolia, 1300–1451, [in:] The Cambridge History of Turkey…, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 127. 
6 Anonymous, Tevārīh-i Āl-i Osman, hazır. N. Azamat, İstanbul 1992, pp. 48–49 [later in 
the text: Anonymous]; H. B. Karadeniz, Osmanlılar ve Rumeli Uç Beyleri. Merkez ve Uç, İstanbul 
2015, p. 28; E. Zachariadou, The Ottoman World, [in:] The New Cambridge Medieval History, 
vol. 7: 1415–1453, ed. Ch. Allmand, Cambridge 1998, pp. 812, 814. 
7 M. Kiel, op. cit., pp. 149–155. 
8 E. Zachariadou believes that on one hand, the Treaty of 1403 concluded between Emir 
Süleyman and the neighbouring Christian countries limited the capabilities of the akıncı 
while on the other hand, the invasion led by Timur the Lame and the defeat at Ankara 
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After the defeat at Ankara—suffered in 1402 and brought by Timur the 
Lame—when princes İsa and Mehmed were fighting against each other in 
Anatolia and Mehmed was leading battles with the less influential beys, the 
Ottoman Rumeli enjoyed peace under the reign of Emir Süleyman. The situa-
tion in Anatolia calmed down after prince Mehmed’s victory and at the time 
when prince Süleyman seized a significant part of the Ottoman possessions in 
that region in 1404–1405. The period of relative peace in the Ottoman prov-
inces lasted until the rise of Musa Çelebi in 1409.9 
The situation in Rumeli deteriorated in 1409 when the Anatolian beys 
(prince Mehmed, the ruler of Germiyan, Yakub II and the bey of Karaman) 
united against Emir Süleyman as they were faced with the threat of his expan-
sion.10 Mehmed I, who ruled over the Ottoman territory of Rum, supported 
prince Musa, who was inclined to gain power in the European part of the 
Ottoman state. In the official Ottoman historiography, it was mentioned that 
prince Mehmed agreed to Musa’s proposal to set out to Rumeli, gain its throne 
and rule over the territory on behalf of prince Mehmed.11 As prince Musa be-
gan to rule over Rumeli on his own, he parted ways with the Rumelian military 
aristocracy, especially with the frontier lords. The ruling prince relied on the 
kapıkulu troops, which induced the Rumelians to seek the help of Mehmed I. 
Having defeated Musa in 1413, Mehmed united under his rule all the lands 
which remained in the hands of the Ottomans after the defeat at Ankara. 
The period of unrest in the Ottoman state lasted at least until 1425. It em-
braced problems faced by Mehmed I, which were solved at the time when Şeyh 
Bedreddin’s rebellion was suppressed, and the first act of Düzme Mustafa’s 
defiance, followed by the 5 year-long period of relative peace, and troubles that 
Murad II experienced with relation to Düzme Mustafa, the “little” Mustafa and 
İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Bey’s revolt suppressed in 1425.12 
                                                                                                                   
increased the number of warriors who were arriving to Rumeli, which must have resulted 
in a tense social situation. See for reference: E. A. Zachariadou, The Ottoman World…, op. cit., 
p. 815. However, D. Kastritis emphasizes that the akıncı were dissatisfied with Süleyman’s 
reign due to less marauding expeditions into the neighbouring Christian states as the plun-
ders were one of the main sources of income for them. D. Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid. 
Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413, Leiden–Boston 
2007, pp. 136–137. 
9 D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 111–112. 
10 Ibidem, p. 111; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı tarihi, I. c., Ankara 1972, pp. 335–336.  
11 M. M. Neşrî, Cihânnümâ, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2013, pp. 202–203 [later in the text: 
Neşri-Öztürk]; M. Neşri, Neşrī Tarihi II, hazır. M. A. Köymen, Ankara 1984, p. 36 [later in the 
text: Neşri-Köymen]; Rûhî Târîhi, hazır. H. E. Cengiz Y. Yücel, Ankara 1992 [later in the text: 
Pseudo-Ruhi], p. 424; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., 111. 
12 R. Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ot-
toman Imperial Household 1400–1800, London 2008, p. 45; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 45; E. A. 
Zachariadou, The Ottoman World…, op. cit., p. 815.  
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The Rumelian lords had too great real military and political power to lose 
so they decided to participate in the struggle launched by the princes of the 
Ottoman dynasty. Indeed, they shared power in Rumeli with the frontier 
lords.13 Heath Lowry states that there was a kind of customary division of 
power between the frontier lords who governed Rumeli and the Ottomans 
ruling over Anatolia.14 Even if it is a far-reaching hypothesis, the benefits of 
such a solution were undeniable. With the relatively low involvement of mili-
tary forces and resources on the part of the bey, it enabled the rapid expansion 
and gaining control over huge territories before the end of the 14th century.15 
However, after the defeat at Ankara, the high position of lords who governed 
Rumeli meant that the region was of key importance in the context of the 
struggle for the throne of the whole Ottoman territory and its unification under 
a single member of the dynasty. 
This is illustrated by the example of the brothers who lost this battle: prince 
Süleyman and prince Musa, and their uncle—prince Mustafa, called “the False” 
(Ott. Düzme). In these three cases, it was essential that the princes were aban-
doned by the Rumelian military aristocracy.16 The most important and ac-
curate source of information about the events associated with the first two 
members of the Ottoman dynasty is Ahvâl—a chronicle written in the court of 
Mehmed I, the elements of which are presented in Cihânnümâ by Neşri and 
Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân by Pseudo-Ruhi,17 also known as the Oxford Anonymous.18 
Further descriptions can also be found in the texts written by other Byzantine 
and Ottoman authors.19 
The story of the rivalry between Emir Süleyman and Musa at a glance: 
Prince Musa was boarded on a ship at the port in Sinop and travelled to Wal-
lachia from where Mircea the Elder helped him to get to Rumeli. Afterwards, 
he arrived in Silistria. He rapidly gained support from tovıca and other 
Rumelian timariots.20 Oruç Beğ is the only chronicler who reports that this 
                                                 
13 C. Finkel, Osman’s Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923, London 2006, 
pp. 18–19; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 9. 
14 H. Lowry, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State, New York 2003, pp. 141–142. 
15 The frontier akıncı were not paid by the bey. See for reference: R. Murphey, op. cit., 
p. 45. 
16 D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 140–142. 
17 Pseudo-Ruhi. 
18 D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 28–33. 
19 Laonici Chalcocondylae Athenensis Historiarum Libri Decem, ed. I. Bekker, Bonae 1843, 
pp. 170–171; Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. H. J. Ma-
goulias, Detroit 1975 [later in the text: Doukas]. 
20 For tovıca and other timariots see: P. Fodor, Ottoman Warfare 1300–1453, [in:] 
The Cambridge History of Turkey…, vol. I, op. cit., pp. 198–205. 
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attitude was the result of news spread among tovica saying that prince Musa 
might have held the position of akıncı beği.21 In that time, no prince could hold 
such a function in standard conditions. However, as H. B. Karadeniz suggests, 
Bayezid I could appoint his underage son as a commander of akıncı, which was 
an element of his centralisation policy. Probably, he aimed to make the dynasty 
members gain control over akıncı and therefore break the frontier lords’ 
force.22 According to the extensive narration of Ahvâl, Musa came from Wal-
lachia and took control over the entire Rumeli shortly after he had revealed 
his intention.23 Unfortunately, that source is very laconic when it comes to 
the descriptions of how prince Musa seized power in Rumeli.24 However, 
it indicates that prince Süleyman was in Anatolia at that time.25 Having heard 
that Musa had taken over Rumeli, Süleyman became strongly alarmed. When 
he arrived in Rumeli, first he went to Constantinople where he offered the 
emperor certain lands, most likely in exchange for his support in the fight. 
It was only after this step that he launched the struggle with Musa. The author 
of Ahvâl reports that during the fight a few Rumelian lords decided to support 
prince Süleyman again, which forced Musa to escape and hide in the moun-
tains. At that time, prince Süleyman settled down in Edirne while prince Meh-
med probably used this situation to defeat Süleyman’s forces at Ankara.26 
Meanwhile in Edirne, having drunk too much wine, Süleyman did not listen to 
his advisors who suggested starting the fight. As a result, the entire Rumeli 
started to perceive prince Musa as the ruler.27 
                                                 
21 Oruç Beğ Tarihi. Giriş, Metin, Kronoloji, Dizin, Tıpkıbasım, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2008, 
p. 44 (later in the text: Oruç Beğ). 
22 H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 166. 
23 İdris-i Bitlisî, Heşt Bihişt. II. cilt, hazır. M. Karataş, S. Kaya, Y. Baş, Ankara 2008, p. 235 
[later in the text: İdris-i Bitlisî]; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 204–205; Neşri-Köymen, p. 37; Pseudo-         
-Ruhi, p. 425. 
24 H. B. Karadeniz believes that actually Musa promised tovica to change his policy to-
wards the neighbours and make it more aggressive, which met their expectations and 
enabled him to gain their support. H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 167. 
25 Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 204–205; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 37–38; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 425. 
26 İdris-i Bitlisî, pp. 233, 235–236; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 205–206; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 38–39; 
Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 425–426; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 167; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 147. 
27 Anonymous, pp. 52–53; Âsık Paşazâde, Osmanoğulların tarihi. Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân, 
hazır. K. Yavuz, M. A. Yekta Saraç, İstanbul 2010, 68 [later in the text: Âsık Paşazâde]; İdris-i 
Bitlisî, pp. 239–241; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 206–208; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 39–40; Pseudo-Ruhi, 
pp. 425–427; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 140–142. For the characteristics of the relationship 
between the oldest narrative sources see: H. İnalcık, The Rise of Ottoman Historiographyi, 
[in:] Historians of the Middle East, eds. B. Lewis, P. M. Holt, London–New York–Toronto 
1962, p. 153. 
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Three facts should be noted here: firstly, Emir Süleyman was outside 
Rumeli at the time when prince Musa arrived there. Secondly, the entire 
Rumeli instinctively succumbed to Musa’s reign right after he had appeared on 
the Ottoman territory. Thirdly, some Rumelians changed their mind and 
showed loyalty towards Süleyman after he had come to Rumeli. Therefore, one 
can assume that at least a few beys surrendered to Musa in order to avoid 
problems in case it turned out that he would become the ruler of Rumeli. When 
Süleyman returned, they behaved loyally towards him in the critical moment—
at the time when the armed confrontation between brothers’ troops was likely 
to happen. 
To understand why certain beys rejected Süleyman’s reign, it is worth 
taking a glance at the way he was presented in the source material. It must be 
admitted that the texts were written after the events described above yet it 
seems that the prince’s image is not only the fruit of his defeat. He is portrayed 
as a man who cannot deal with difficulties. It can be clearly seen if one analyzes 
Musa’s second approach to gain power in Rumeli. Emir Süleyman seems to be 
completely not interested in fighting—we can see a person who entertains 
oneself in a hamam and enjoys conversations while obviously drinking wine.28 
The chroniclers stemming from the gazi environment presented the same im-
age of the ruler, which indicates that his behaviour was remarkably unaccept-
able for the gazis.29 In the chronicles of the early Ottoman state, only three 
rulers were portrayed this way: Bayezid the Thunderbolt, Emir Süleyman and 
Bayezid II.30 It seems that this biased image served to convince the audience 
that Emir Süleyman was not worthy to have the supreme power because of the 
lack of necessary predispositions.31 Perhaps, it was also aimed to discredit him 
in the eyes of those who could attribute the responsibility for his death to 
prince Mehmed who was responsible for the Musa’s actions. Nevertheless, this 
perception of prince Süleyman might have been the reason for rejecting him as 
a candidate for the throne. 
Musa’s rule quickly proved to be very oppressive.32 Despite the different 
levels of detail, the narration in the majority of source texts has a negative con-
                                                 
28 Anonymous, p. 51; Âsık Paşazâde, 67; Fatih Devri Kaynaklarından Düstûrnâme-i Enverî. 
Osmanlı Tarihi Kısmı (1299–1466), hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2003, p. 42; Müneccimbaşı 
Ahmed ibn Lütfullah, Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluş Tarihi. Câmiü’d-düvel (1299–1481), çev. 
A. Ağırakça, İstanbul 2014, p. 189; Neşri-Öztürk, p. 206; Neşri-Köymen, p. 39; Pseudo-Ruhi, 
pp. 425–426. 
29 H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 162–163, 169–170. 
30 N. Öztürk, 14–15. Asır Osmanlı Kültür Tarihi. Devlet Düzeni – Sosyal Hayatı, İstanbul 
2014, pp. 247–251. 
31 D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 156. 
32 Ibidem, pp. 159–160. 
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notation. Aşık Paşazade notes that all sanjaks were given to Musa’s people.33 
Similarly, the author of the Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle writes that Musa 
favoured his people and deprived the Rumelians of their posts.34 It might not 
have been something strange—anything but an ordinary attempt to centralize 
the power. Previously, Rumeli had experienced such attempts, for instance 
under the reign of Bayezid the Thunderbolt.35 Neşri’s Ahvâl is the most com-
prehensive source of information here. The author writes explicitly that the 
most important reason for the reluctance shown by the Rumelian beys towards 
Musa was the completely arbitrary confiscation of assets, which was organised 
by the ruler.36 Somewhat milder comments can be found in the Oxford Anony-
mous.37 The confiscations are said to be carried out in an impertinent way: 
The prince chose those beys who seemed to be the richest and not only did 
he rob them of their wealth but also often killed them. That is why none of the 
Rumelian lords could be certain what their future would bring.38 The chroni-
cles written by the Byzantine and Serbian authors also report prince Musa’s 
aggressive politics. These include the significant text by Constantine the 
Philosopher, who drew attention to the fact that initially, Musa seemed to act 
peacefully and fairly liberally but later he became harsh even to his servants.39 
Doukas was one of the Byzantine chroniclers who spoke about Musa in a simi-
lar tone.40 Sphrantzes mentions only that Emperor Manuel II was engaged in 
the fight against Musa.41 
The author of the Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle is the single historian who 
attempts to defend Musa and skips the problem of arbitrarily organised confis-
cations while focusing on the Rumelians’ behaviour. He talks about the reasons 
for which Musa hated the Rumelian lords, describes how Musa tested Evrenos’s 
loyalty but also presented the prince’s generosity towards his own kapıkulu 
troops. Finally, the chronicler deals in detail with the Kör Şah Melik’s escape to 
Constantinople and his getting into prince Mehmed’s camp.42 This is a unique 
                                                 
33 Âsık Paşazâde, 69; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 161. 
34 Anonymous, p. 54; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 161. 
35 H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 173–174, 182, 224–227. 
36 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 209, n. 2928; Neşri-Köymen, p. 41. 
37 Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 427. 
38 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 209, n. 2928; Neşri-Köymen, p. 41. 
39 Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen, 
hrsg. u. ubers. von M. Braun, Wiesbaden 1956, 31; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 144. 
40 Doukas, XIX, 7–10. 
41 The Fall of the Byzantine Empire. A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes, trans. M. Philip-
pides, Amherst 1980, III 1 [later in the text: Sphrantzes]. 
42 Anonymous, pp. 54–55; R. Murphey, op. cit., p. 45; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 184–189; 
D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 160; A. Kılıç, op. cit., pp. 91–92. 
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fragment that might have been written by someone from Musa’s environment, 
for example, a member of the kapıkulu. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that there 
can be heard the voice of the supporters of the defeated prince although usually 
it is the winner who writes the history.43 
The description of Musa’s fall looks somewhat different. Before Mehmed 
arrived in Rumeli, the beys had informed him about their reluctance towards 
prince Musa. There also appeared high-rank fugitives who escaped from Musa. 
Due to the fact that Musa based his rule on the kapıkulu troops, fighting against 
him turned out to be an ordeal. Mehmed undertook his struggle for Rumeli 
three times. His first invasion in Rumeli was prepared by an arrangement with 
the Byzantine emperor, whom he promised peace after the conquest of the 
territory. Already during the first battle of Çatalca, the influential frontier 
lord—Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey—supported Mehmed and encouraged the 
prince to continue the fight against Musa. Although the Rumelian beys left 
Musa, he was still backed by remarkable kapıkulu forces. It was the janissaries 
who convinced Musa not to escape as they were afraid of revenge which the 
potential winners could take (sen gidicek bizi dahı helāk iderler).44 They also 
forced prince Mehmed to flee from the battlefield. Musa did not kill Mehmed’s 
captured people, which seems to somehow defy the story about favoring the 
kapıkulu troops only.45 It also shows that, perhaps, the author of the Oxford 
Anonymous was right when pointing to the fact that loyalty was the reason for 
which Musa either disliked people or accepted them.46 Mehmed returned to 
Anatolia but shortly after that, he managed to prepare the second expedition to 
Rumeli, during which he suffered a defeat again. To organize the third expedi-
tion, he sought help from his father-in-law—the bey of Dulkadir—and asked 
for more warriors. Having got support from the bey and from Constantinople, 
Mehmed set out to fight against Musa. Near Vize Mehmed received a letter from 
Evrenos Bey, in which he, as an experienced gazi, advised Mehmed on what to 
do, and also reported that frontier lords supported him. Edirne did not suc-
cumb to Mehmed’s rule and decided to unconditionally accept the prince who 
would win the fight. Prince Mehmed followed Evrenos’s advice and headed for 
Serbia and then for Bulgaria but Musa avoided a clash. Finally, the clash took 
place near Sofia—at Çamurlu. A big part of the Rumelian beys had fled to prince 
Mehmed before. The author of Ahvâl mentions that before the battle started, 
                                                 
43 Âsık Paşazâde, 70. 
44 Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 428; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 190–191. 
45 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 212; Neşri-Köymen, p. 44; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 191. 
46 Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 427. 
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Musa gave the order to imprison certain Rumelian beys, which intensified the 
lords’ hatred towards him.47 Eventually, Musa’s janissaries did not manage to 
stand the attack launched by Mehmed’s troops. Musa, who escaped from the 
battlefield, was stopped in the muddy area of Çamurlu where he was captured 
by Mehmed’s warriors and then strangled by one of them.48 
There are several noteworthy facts here: Right from the beginning, prince 
Musa stood in opposition to the military aristocracy in Rumeli and invested 
primarily in the kapıkulu troops and people showing loyalty towards him. What 
is more, he treated the Rumelian beys harshly. Secondly, Mehmed I lost 
the struggle with Musa twice. Thirdly, Mehmed’s defeats did not prevent the 
Rumelian beys from supporting him. The reluctance towards Musa provoked 
their decision to change the ruler of Rumeli to such an extent that they wanted 
to give the throne to Mehmed despite his initial failure. 
Historiography presents prince Musa’s reign as a period of aggressive pol-
icy against the neighbouring states. He is considered a ruthless ruler whose 
character resembles Bayezid the Thunderbolt and who continues his policy.49 
Undoubtedly, he continued Bayezid’s approach as far as the centralization of 
power is concerned. However, the Rumelian beys could perceive him as an 
untrustworthy continuator of the conquest policy. As noted by many authors, 
Mircea the Elder was said to help Musa in order to draw the akıncı away from 
Wallachia.50 
According to the source materials, his reign was not a period of internal 
peace in his state as well. This is why Mehmed gained support on the part of 
the frontier lords and, as a result, of the whole Rumeli. However, one may ven-
ture to say that if Musa had been behaving in a different way, the division of the 
Ottoman state into the Rumelian and the Anatolian part would have been more 
permanent. 
A situation similar to that when Emir Süleyman lost his power happened in 
1421. The entire Rumeli sided with Düzme Mustafa during his second rebellion 
and then quite easily transferred its loyalty to Murad II. The reports on those 
events can be found in the Ottoman and Byzantine sources and are quite ex-
tensive. It should be taken into account that the Ottoman sources do not men-
                                                 
47 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 219; Neşri-Köymen, p. 52; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 432; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., 
pp. 192–193; A. Kılıç, op. cit., p. 93. 
48 İdris-i Bitlisî, pp. 251–262; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 215–221; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 47–54; 
Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 429–433; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 192–195; A. Kılıç, op. cit., pp. 93–94. 
49 D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 159. 
50 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 206; Neşri-Köymen, p. 37; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 424; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., 
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tion his first attempt to seize power in Rumeli but it is well-documented in the 
Byzantine historiography and actually there is no doubt that it happened.51 
The narration is as follows: At first, Mustafa won support on the part of cer-
tain members of Evrenos’s family (Evrenos died a few years earlier). As a re-
sult, the entire Rumeli turned against Mustafa. Following the advice of İzmiro-
ğlu Cüneyd Bey, the prince decided to attack and conquer Anatolia in order to 
unite all Ottoman lands under his sceptre. Having crossed the straits, the 
Rumelians moved in the direction of Bursa. The battle took place at Ulubad 
where Mustafa arrived together with the Rumelian army. It was also then that 
some warriors decided to leave prince Mustafa’s camp and sided with Murad II. 
The Ottoman texts mention for instance the members of Gümlüoğlu, Evrenoso-
ğlu and Turahan families.52 
The following facts should be noted here: During his uncle’s rebellion, 
Murad II stayed in Anatolia. Secondly, the entire Rumeli supported prince 
Mustafa. Thirdly, in the crucial point of the struggle, that is during the Battle of 
Ulubad, the greater part of the Rumelian forces decided to show their loyalty 
towards Murad II again. 
The aforementioned facts lead to the conclusion that there is a certain anal-
ogy between the Rumelian lords’ approach presented during the first Musa’s 
attempt to seize power in Rumeli in 1409 and the second Mustafa’s rebellion in 
1421. It is remarkable that at first, all the beys supported the new candidate for 
the throne and then, in the crucial moment for the struggle between two mem-
bers of the dynasty, some of them returned to the one that had held power 
before.53 According to R. Murphey, it resulted from the fact that the lords felt 
highly responsible for the state. Their aim was to ensure that in the difficult 
time for the state when its future was uncertain, the throne would belong to 
a competent ruler who could guarantee the continuation of the dynasty and the 
statehood.54 Without any doubt, this argumentation is true. However, it seems 
that there were also more down-to-earth motives, such as simply to survive. 
The lords wanted to survive in case the rulers who had been sitting on the 
throne so far were defeated. Such motivation seems to be true to some extent 
                                                 
51 A comprehensive report on the events of 1416 can be found in the chronicles by Dou-
kas, Chalkokondyles and Sphrantzes. See: Doukas, XXII, 3–5; Laonici Chalcocondylae Athenen-
sis Historiarum Libri Decem, ed. I. Bekker, Bonae 1843, pp. 203–204; Sphrantzes, IV 4. See 
also: N. Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, Gotha 1908, pp. 366–376; H. B. Karadeniz, 
op. cit., pp. 204–212. 
52 Anonymous, p. 63; Âsık Paşazâde, 83; Oruç Beğ, pp. 27–28; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 236–237; 
Neşri-Köymen, p. 74. 
53 Neşri-Öztürk, p. 237; Neşri-Köymen, p. 73. 
54 R. Murphey, op. cit., p. 23. 
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in the light of George Sfrantzes’s passage describing the moment when the 
grand vizier of Mehmed I—Bayezid Pasha—decided to side with Düzme 
Mustafa: „[…] his mission was to keep the West under Murad’s authority, 
if possible.”55 Generally, it is also compatible with the image shown in the most 
extensive description by Doukas.56 Mustafa’s attempt also shows that having 
the limited support of the frontier lords, one could gain power in Rumeli, espe-
cially if the opponent was a member of kapıkulu and not a member of the 
dynasty.57 The Rumelian lords created a system which helped them survive in 
the uncertain times, regardless of the fact who would become the ruler of 
Rumeli. The Rumelian lords’ activity was an important factor which influenced 
the outcome of the competition. Indeed, they constituted a strong and quite 
unified military factor.58 At the same time, it was not obvious whom they would 
give their support. First, they somehow led to Emir Süleyman’s fall, then to 
prince Musa’s failure, and after all, they must have been responsible, to some 
extent, for Sheikh Bedreddin’s rebellion and Mustafa’s victory in 1421. 
The activity on the part of the lords from the Ottoman Anatolia, which suffered 
a great loss due to Timur the Lame’s invasion, stood in contrast with the 
Rumelian lords’ behaviour. This contrast can also be seen with regard to fights 
against the Anatolian beys. The Anatolian lords showed quite unwavering sup-
port for Mehmed I and then Murad II. The influential frontier lords somehow 
managed the Rumelian beys—it was clear when the Evrenos’s family changed 
their mind and decided to support Mustafa, as well as at the time when the 
lords were persuaded by Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey to leave Mustafa.59 
Let us ask a reversed question: when did a candidate for the throne lose 
the beys’ trust? To answer this question, it may be helpful to take a glance at 
the cases of prince İsa, who tried to seize power in Anatolia three times, and 
Düzme Mustafa, who also attempted to take power more than once. As far as 
İsa’s example is concerned, his initial defeat diminished his credibility in the 
eyes of his serfs. Although İsa’s struggle with prince Mehmed was not directly 
related to Rumeli as it took place in Anatolia, it is worth taking a brief look at 
its course of action. Prince İsa had a great starting position since after the Battle 
of Ankara he took control over the important Ottoman territory—Bithynia—
and an extremely notable city of Bursa.60 He was involved in a struggle with 
                                                 
55 Sphrantzes, IX 2. 
56 Doukas, XXIV 8. 
57 H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 210. 
58 Ibidem, p. 160; A. Kılıç, op. cit., p. 84. 
59 Ibidem. 
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Mehmed, who gathered his forces in Amasya and Tokat and—which was 
crucial in shifting the balance of power—received support from Eyne Bey 
Subaşı—the governor of Balıkesir, who had been cooperating with Emir 
Süleyman before.61 Despite this, the part of the Ottoman territory which İsa 
conquered after the Battle of Ankara sided with him during the first conflict 
with prince Mehmed. During the second attempt to seize the lands which 
he previously possessed, he was always asked to prove his friendship with 
prince Mehmed. Next time, no one wanted to be subordinate to him in any way. 
The same might have happened in the case of the “false” Mustafa, who carried 
the stigma of failure during his second approach to seize power. Furthermore, 
the unfavourable atmosphere after the execution of Bayezid Pasha could also 
play a role here. Perhaps, that context reminded the Rumelian lords of Musa’s 
reign and made them fearful of losing their lives as Bayezid Pasha was executed 
despite the fact that he had sworn to be obedient to Prince Mustafa. 
One more issue should be noted here. In both cases, the rulers of Rumeli 
stayed in Anatolia. The fact is that almost from the very beginning, the mem-
bers of the Ottoman dynasty manifested their presence in Rumeli. The first 
conquests were controlled by the oldest son of Orhan—prince Süleyman. 
However, the ruler’s people knew that the gazis are too dangerous and should 
be under their direct control. For this reason, already during the reign of 
the third Ottoman ruler, Murad I, the princes were ousted from the Rumelian 
frontier.62 As a result, the ruler’s direct control over the Rumelian frontier 
meant that his highest dignitaries took part in expeditions and military projects 
organized in Rumeli. Hence, Gazi Evrenos most often acted in cooperation with 
Lala Şahin, Kara Halil Pasha, and after his death, with his son and the new 
grand vizier—Ali Pasha.63 P. Metzel demonstrates that Rumeli was not only 
a borderland but also the core of the Ottoman state.64 
L. Darling emphasized the correlation between the ruler’s presence in 
Rumeli and the instability of the dynasty caused by the disloyalty among its 
serfs, especially among the frontier lords. The researcher notes that both 
Süleyman Pasha’s death and the occupation of Gallipoli by Amadeo VI of Savoy 
in 1366 took place at the moment when Murad I was outside Rumeli. At that 
time, he stayed in Anatolia.65 He was forced to do so as he was faced with the 
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63 Oruç Beğ, pp. 27–28. 
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threat posed by the Anatolian beyliks—Karaman and Eretna.66 These inspiring 
observations made by the American researcher are worth applying to the next 
decades involving the civil war (fetret devri) and the transitional period during 
the reign of Mehmed I and Murad II, which may help us draw conclusions with 
regard to the correlation between the ruler’s presence in Rumeli and the loy-
alty among the local lords. 
During the civil war (1403–1413), the first Musa’s attempt to capture 
Rumeli was made at the time when Emir Süleyman was in Anatolia.67 The 
situation looked similar in the case of prince Mustafa, called Düzme. When 
he appeared in Rumeli in 1421, Murad II stayed in Anatolia. Rumeli fell into 
Mustafa’s hands easily but then he was betrayed in the crucial moment of 
the struggle. Competing with his rival Musa, who was residing in Rumeli, 
prince Mehmed had to organize three expeditions to Rumeli and despite the 
local beys’ support, he was considered the ruler of the territory only after his 
siege in the battle. As seen on the example of prince Mehmed (including his 
previous struggle with Emir Süleyman), it was much easier to try to seize 
power when he was in Rumeli rather than when he started from Anatolia. Most 
likely, the influence of the akıncı and their commanders was the deciding factor 
here. It was better to gain their support first rather than to be afraid of an at-
tack coming from Rumeli. 
It seems that the Rumelian lords sided with that member of the dynasty 
who resided in Rumeli. This was also pointed out by L. Chalkokondyles in his 
description of Musa’s attempt to seize power there.68 Having heard the news 
about Musa’s arrival, Süleyman, who was in Anatolia at that time, was in 
a hurry to arrive in Rumeli as soon as possible because the one who appears 
on a given territory first becomes its ruler.69 When the ruler did not reside in 
the European part of the Ottoman state, he had to be aware that he could lose 
support in favour of his brother or uncle. The similar situation could be ob-
served in the period of Mehmed I’s autonomous reign and after his death. 
However, it can be assumed that the Rumelian lords followed a survival strat-
egy: They did not want to lose the possibility to function in case a candidate for 
the throne would win a struggle. At the same time, they left room for the return 
to loyalty towards the former ruler in case a candidate would be defeated. 
The lords could calculate which approach was the most profitable for them. 
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They knew that if a candidate managed to seize power, they would not create 
the impression that they had not wanted to accept him before. Otherwise, they 
would return to loyalty towards the previous ruler. Prince Musa’s attitude 
seems to confirm this reasoning as he did not want to agree with it and per-
ceived the Rumelian lords as traitors—this image emerges from the Ottoman 
Anonymous Chronicle whose author tries to stand up for the prince.70 It seems 
that such a behaviour was acceptable to some extent, which can be seen in the 
case of Bayezid Pasha. Assuming that after the first lost struggle in Rumeli 
Bayezid Pasha could side with Murad II again,71 İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Bey per-
suaded Mustafa to execute him. 
Rumeli, and especially its eastern part, which was ruled by the Ottomans for 
several decades and enjoyed a period of peace, could attempt to choose be-
tween the members of the dynasty. The fate changed during the reign of Prince 
Musa, who observed the steps taken especially by the aristocracy and could 
not accept their actions. One may draw a conclusion that Rumeli started to 
encounter difficulties at that time. However, if the territory had not been faced 
with them, the period of the division of the state—and, in turn, the instability in 
the entire Ottoman state—would have lasted longer. 
 
Translated by Karolina Gajowiec 
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